In the Heat of Competition: Tort Liability of One Participant to Another: Why Can\u27t Participants be Required to be Reasonable by Yasser, Ray
University of Tulsa College of Law
TU Law Digital Commons
Articles, Chapters in Books and Other Contributions to Scholarly Works
1995
In the Heat of Competition: Tort Liability of One
Participant to Another: Why Can't Participants be
Required to be Reasonable
Ray Yasser
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/fac_pub
Part of the Entertainment and Sports Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles, Chapters in Books
and Other Contributions to Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of TU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
daniel-bell@utulsa.edu.
Recommended Citation
5 Seton Hall J. Sport L. 253 (1995).
IN THE HEAT OF COMPETITION: TORT LIABILITY
OF ONE PARTICIPANT TO ANOTHER; WHY CAN'T
PARTICIPANTS BE REQUIRED TO BE
REASONABLE?
Ray Yasser1
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 254
II. INTENTIONAL TORTS .................................................................... 255
III. RECKLESSNESS ............................................................................ 257
IV. N EGLIGENCE ............................................................................... 261
V . CONCLUSION ............................................................................... 270
Had the parties been upon the playgrounds of the school, engaged in
the usual boyish sports, the defendant being free from malice, wanton-
ness, or negligence, and intending no harm to plaintiff in what he did,
we should hesitate to hold the act of the defendant unlawful, or that he
could be held liable in this action. Some consideration is due to the
implied license of the playgrounds.2
Playing at Hand-Sword, Bucklers, Foot-ball, Wrestling, and the like,
whereby one of them receiveth a hurt... some are of the opinion that
this is a [wrong] ... some others are of opinion, that this is no
[wrong] ... but that they shall have their pardon, of course, as for
misadventure, for that such their play was by consent, and again, there
1. Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law; J.D., Duke University, 1974;
BAk, University of Delaware, 1971. I would like to acknowledge the extraordinary contribu-
tion of my research assistant, Sam Schiller. Sam is a Consensus All-American research assis-
tant.
2. Vosburg v. Putney, 50 N.W. 403, 404 (Wis. 1891). Vosburg is a landmark torts case
that has been used to confound and befuddle generations of law students by obfuscating the
meaning of intent. To my knowledge, it has not been cited in the sports law context. As one
who has taught torts for 20 years now (using Vosburg as my leadoff case), and who has an
abiding interest in sports law, I confess to feeling a profound sense of order and symmetry in
using Vosburg to kick off this piece.
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was no former intent to do hurt, or any former malice, but done only
for disport, and trial of Man-hood.3
I. INTRODUCTION
Participation in sports carries with it special risks. It is proba-
bly fair to say that sports activities-baseball, basketball, football,
tennis, racquetball, and wrestling, for example (not to mention
Hand-Sword, Bucklers and the like)-create greater risks of physi-
cal harm than do most other human activities. Typically, injuries
incurred in athletic competition are not of tortious origin, but they
occur rather as a result of the normal risks associated with partici-
pation in the sport. For example, when a basketball player breaks
his ankle by jumping and inadvertently landing on his opponent's
foot, good lawyers would not argue that the opponent is a tortfea-
sor. However, injuries can occur as a consequence of arguably
tortious behavior by a participant.4 This article explores the theo-
ries of tort liability that are available to one participant in a suit
against a fellow participant, for injuries that occur "in the heat of
competition." In addition, this article includes a prediction of the
future of liability for the sports participant.
Generally, an athlete so injured can base an action to recover on
three theories: (1) an intentional tort such as battery or assault, (2)
recklessness, and (3) negligence. Even though decisions that allow
a simple negligence cause of action can be found in jurisdictions
stretching from Washington state to Connecticut to Louisiana, the
3. M.Dalton, The Countrey Justice Cap. 96, 246 (1635). The problem is not a new one.
The focus of this paper is on civil, not criminal, liability. For a good history of the consent
issue as it pertains to criminal liability in the sports context, see Note, Consent in Criminal
Law: Violence in Sports, 75 MICH. L. REv. 148, 169-172 (1976). I have also found that it lends
a serious air of credibility to a law review article to quote something that was written a long,
long time ago. See C. Steven Bradford, As I Lay Writing, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 13 (1994).
4. A broad definition of "participant" could include referees, cheerleaders, and coaches.
A tort case against a referee might well involve a theory of negligent supervision. Carraba v.
Anacortes School Dist. No. 103, 435 P.2d 936 (Wash. 1967)(concerning a referee's negligence
in failing to detect an illegal wrestling hold). For example, a referee who permits a boxing
match to continue when a reasonable referee would stop it might be named as a defendant in
a lawsuit by the injured boxer. On the other hand, a referee attacked by a disgruntled partic-
ipant might initiate a lawsuit of his own on a battery theory. The potential liability of a
coach is vast. See generally RAY YASSER, LIABILITY FOR SPORTS INJURIES, IN LAW OF PROFES-
SIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS § 1405 (1994). A cheerleader who is injured when performing
an acrobatic cheer also may well be the victim of a tortfeasor-co-participant. Although there
are no reported cases thus far, look for one to come to your neighborhood soon. The focus of
this article is on torts that occur in the heat of competition, when one participant (in the
narrow sense) injures a co-participant.
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prevailing view appears to be that the participant to participant
sports injury case requires at least recklessness.5
II. INTENTIONAL TORTS
A simple definition of battery is the intentional, unprivileged,
harmful or offensive contact by the defendant with the person of
another.' An assault is committed when the defendant, without
privilege, intentionally places the plaintiff in apprehension of an
immediate harmful or offensive touching.7 Sports activities are rife
with what arguably can be termed assaults and batteries. A review
of the cases indicates that a defense of privilege is often the key
issue in such litigation.' The Restatement (Second) of Torts cate-
gorizes privileges in terms of whether they are consensual or
nonconsensual? Commonly accepted nonconsensual privileges
include self-defense, defense of others, and defense of property. In
sports, the consent privilege weighs heavily.
As a starting point, in a series of cases beginning around the
turn of the century the courts dealt with the issue of consent in the
"mutual combat" context.1 ° The courts were repeatedly faced with
5. The recklessness required relates to the theory of recovery, not the conduct of legal
counsel.
6. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 9, at 39 (5th
ed. 1984).
7. Id. § 10, at 43.
8. Griggas v. Clausen, 128 N.E.2d 363 (fl. Ct. App. 1955)(regarding a basketball player
punched by an opponent); Gibeline v. Smith, 80 S.W. 961 (Mo. Ct. App. 1904)(holding that an
adult who voluntarily engaged in play consented to bodily contacts inherent in game); Averill
v. Luttrell, 311 S.W.2d 812 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957)(concerning a batter struck by opposing
team's catcher); Tomjanovich v. California Sports, Inc., No. 11-78-243 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 10,
1979) (pertaining to a professional basketball player struck in face by opposing team mem-
ber); Hogenson v. Williams, 542 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976) (regarding an athlete's hel-
met struck by irate coach).
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 10 (1965). The Restatement defines privilege as:
§ 10. PRIVILEGE
(1) The word "privilege" is used... to denote the fact that conduct which, under
ordinary circumstances, would subject the actor to liability, under particular cir-
cumstances does not subject him to such liability.
(2) A privilege may be based upon (a) the consent of the other affected by the
actor's conduct, or (b) the fact that its exercise is necessary for the protection of
some interest of the actor or of the public which is of such importance as to justify
the harm caused or threatened by its exercise.
Id.
10. McNeil v. Mullin, 79 P. 168 (Kan. 1905)(reasoning that even where both participants
consent, either has a cause of action against the other for damages resulting from injuries
received in a fight); Parmentier v. McGinnis, 147 N.W. 1007 (Wis. 1914)(stating that whether
or not a participant in a boxing contest knew of or consented to the nature of the fight, the
jury may come to conclusions on liability as a question of fact); Hart v. Geysel, 294 P. 570
(Wash. 1930)(determining that a prize fighter who expressly consents to and engages in a
fight should not have a right to recover damages sustained from the combat); McAdams v.
Windham, 94 So. 742 (Ala. 1922)(holding that there is no cause of action in a mutually en-
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the task of determining precisely to what risks a voluntary partici-
pant consents." The intentional tort theory is the clearest basis
for an action, as the available defenses are well established and
generally agreed on.' 2 The prevailing view is that although partic-
ipation in an athletic contest involves manifestation of consent to
those bodily contacts which are permitted by the rules of the game
and foreseeable, an intentional act causing injury, which goes be-
yond what is ordinarily permissible in an unforeseeable way, is an
assault and battery for which recovery may be had. 3
In one New York case, the court held that justification for an
assault, even in the sports context, cannot be presumed.'4 Simi-
larly, an Illinois court ruled that a wanton and unprovoked assault
in a game of basketball is sufficient to sustain a cause of action.'5
tered boxing match without evidence of negligent or reckless conduct).
11. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
12. For the consent defense see OBrien v. Cunard S.S. Co., 28 N.E. 266 (Mass. 1891);
Dicenzo v. Berg, 16 A.2d 5 (Pa. 1940). For a self-defense case, see Courvoisier v. Raymond, 47
P. 284 (Colo. 189.6); Pearson v. Taylor, 116 So.2d 833 (La. Ct. App. 1959); Maichle v. Jonovic,
230 N.W.2d 789 (Wis. 1975). To argue the defense of others, see State v. Totman, 80 Mo. App.
125 (1899); Fink v. Thomas, 66 S.E. 650 (W. Va. 1909); Lopez v. Surchia, 246 P.2d 111 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1952). See also cases discussed under recklessness, infra notes 16-36.
13. Overall v. Kadella, 361 N.W.2d 352 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984). In Overall, the plaintiff
brought an action against the defendant for injuries he sustained during a fight after a hock-
ey game. During the fight, the defendant hit the plaintiff, rendering him unconscious and
causing severe eye injury. Id. at 352, 353. The trial court entered a judgment for the plaintiff
in the amount of $46,000. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that
"there is general agreement that an intentional act causing injury, which goes beyond what
is ordinarily permissible, is an assault and batter for which recovery may be had." Id. at 355,
citing 4 AM.JUR. 2d., Amusements & Exhibitions, § 86, at 211.
14. People v. Freer, 381 N.Y.S.2d 976 (Dist. Ct. 1976). The complainant and the defen-
dant Were playing as participants on opposite teams in a football game. The defendant was
carrying the ball when the complainant tackled him. In the course of the tackle the complain-
ant punched the defendant in the throat. Both fell to the ground and there was a pile up.
After all the players got off of the defendant, he punched the complainant in the eye, causing
damage that included a laceration requiring plastic surgery. While the court recognized two
defenses to assault by participants in sporting events, namely, that the act was consented to
as being part of the game (consent) or that the act was justified as an act of "self defense,"
the court rejected both of these defenses in this case. It reasoned that where an attack which
the defendant may have believed was being made upon him is terminated and time has
passed, the defendant is deprived of any reasonable basis to believe that he is in danger and
that he may justifiably engage in a further act of defense. Moreover, the plaintiff cannot be
deemed to have consented to such an attack. Id.
15. Griggas v. Clauson, 128 N.E.2d 363 (Ill. App. Ct. 1955). The plaintiff and defendant
were on opposing teams in an amateur basketball game. The plaintiff alleged that while he
had his back to the defendant, the defendant maliciously, wantonly and wilfully, and without
provocation, assaulted the plaintiff. He further alleged that the defendant struck the plaintiff
violently in the head and knocked the plaintiff unconscious to the floor. The appellate court
rejected the defense's argument that it was error for the trial court to instruct the jury that
they consider as an aggravation of wrong the mental suffering of the plaintiff, arising from
the insult and the indignity of the defendant's blow, for assessment of damages. Id.
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Clearly no court disputes the view that an intentional tort theo-
ry is a viable cause of action in the sports participant to participant
context, with the caveat that a defense of privilege may prevail.
III. RECKLESSNESS
Recklessness is conduct that creates a higher degree of risk
than that created by simple negligence. 6 The defense of assump-
tion of risk may be a defense to the recklessness-based cause of
action.1
7
The decisions of the Illinois Appellate Court are illustrative of
the handling of the recklessness cause of action in the sports con-
text. A soccer match between two amateur high school teams was
the setting for Nabozny v. Barnhill." Barnhill, a forward, entered
the opposing goalkeeper's penalty area and kicked the plaintiff,
Nabozny, in the head as he was receiving a pass. The contact
caused permanent skull and brain damage to Nabozny. Barnhill's
action was a violation of the F.I.F.A. rules, which prohibited a play-
er from making contact with a goalkeeper in possession of the ball
in the penalty area.' 9 The defendant in this case was alleged to
have been negligent; this was the first Illinois case involving orga-
nized athletic competition where one of the participants was so
charged. The trial court's decision directing a verdict for defendant
Barnhill was reversed, and a new trial was ordered. It is important
to note, however, that the plaintiff did not recover on a negligence
theory. The Illinois appellate court revisited this issue on five year
intervals for the next ten years.
In 1980, the court again held that the plaintiff in a sports injury
case must show something worse than ordinary negligence on the
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500. The Restatement states it thus:
The actor's conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of another if he does an act
or intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or
having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize, not
only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another, but
also that such risk is substantially greater than that which is necessary to make
his conduct negligent.
Id.
17. See infra note 36. What the court might actually be saying when it allows an as-
sumption of risk defense is that there is no duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, un-
der the circumstances, to refrain from the kind of conduct about which the plaintiff com-
plains. This appears to be particularly true in the negligence cases and some courts and
many commentators have pointed out that the assumption of risk defense, in the negligence
context, is unnecessary if duty and comparative negligence are properly applied. See Mei-
strich v. Casino Arena Attractions, 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90 (1959).
18. 334 N.E.2d 258 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975).
19. Id. at 261. The appellate court stated that: "a player is liable for injury in a tort
action if his conduct is such that it is either deliberate, wilful or with a reckless disregard for
the safety of the other player so as to cause injury to that player." Id.
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part of the defendant."0  The plaintiff in the case, Oswald, was
injured when he was kicked while playing basketball in a required
high school gym class. The court went out of its way to distinguish
the cause of action in this case from that in the non-contact sport
context case by stating that "participants in bodily contact games
such as basketball assume greater risks than do golfers and others
involved in non-physical contact sports."2
In 1985, the Illinois appellate court again addressed liability in
the participant to participant sports injury case.22 Since the court
based its ruling on a negligence analysis, however, a discussion of
the rationale is reserved for the treatment of "negligence" cases to
follow.
Finally, in 1994 an Illinois appellate court revisited the issue in
Lundrum v. Gonzalez. 3 The plaintiff in Lundrum was playing
first base in an informal softball game. The defendant ran into the
plaintiff while running the bases, causing him to fall on his shoul-
der and sustain serious injury. Relying on Nabozny, the court con-
cluded that the plaintiff could not recover, since he had not shown
wilful or wanton conduct on the part of the defendant.24
In Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc. (Hackbart I),25 a Den-
ver Bronco defensive player (Hackbart) was severely injured after a
Cincinnati pass was intercepted near the goal line. Hackbart a-
ttempted to block a Bengal offensive player (Clark) and fell to the
ground. Clark, "acting out of anger and frustration, but without
specific intent to injure.., stepped forward and struck a blow with
his right forearm to the back of the kneeling plaintiffs head.""
Hackbart sustained a neck injury and sought recovery on the theo-
ries of reckless misconduct and failure of the Bengals to instruct
and control Clark. The trial court held that the plaintiff could not
recover because professional football is inherently violent and be-
cause adequate sanctions were available through the imposition of
monetary penalties and expulsion from the game.
Hackbart 1" reversed the trial court's findings and conclu-
sions. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found that "there are no
principles of law which allow a court to rule out certain tortious
20. Oswald v. Township High School Distr. No. 214, 406 N.E.2d 157 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
21. Id. at 160.
22. Ramos by Ramos v. City of Countryside, 45 N.E.2d 418 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
23. 629 N.E.2d 710 (Ml1. App. Ct. 1994).
24. Id. at 715.
25. 435 F.Supp. 352 (D. Colo. 1977).
26. Id. at 353.
27. Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc. (Hackbart II), 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1979).
[Vol. 5258
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conduct"28 simply because it occurs in a generally rough game.
Additionally, the questioned conduct by Clark was explicitly prohib-
ited by the rules of the game.29 The appellate court also ruled
that the appropriate standard for liability was recklessness, where
intent cannot be shown. The plaintiff Hackbart was entitled to
have the case tried on the assessment of his rights and not on the
trial court's determination that "as a matter of social policy the
game was so violent and unlawful that value lines could not be
drawn."30
In Gauvin v. Clark,"' the standard of care that participants
owe one another was again at issue, this time in the setting of a
hockey game. Clark "butt-ended" Gauvin by taking the back end of
his hockey stick and striking Gauvin in the abdomen, causing seri-
ous injuries. The court ruled that Clark was not liable because he
had not acted recklessly, reasoning that preclusion of liability
where there is only negligence furthers the policy that "vigorous
and active participation in sporting events should not be chilled by
the threat of litigation."2
Bourque v. Duplechin33 involved injuries suffered by a second
baseman in a summer league softball game. Bourque, the second
baseman, was standing five feet away from the base when he was
hit under the chin and severely injured by the base runner, Duple-
chin. A double play throw had forced Duplechin out, but he contin-
ued to run toward Bourque at full speed. To make contact with the
second baseman, Duplechin left the basepath. Although the defen-
dant alleged that Bourque had assumed the risk of injury, the court
concluded that the runner's "negligent" conduct was not a risk as-
sumed by softball players. Duplechin was found liable and Bourque
recovered for his injuries.
Bourque is really more accurately viewed as a case in which the
defendant was liable because he was reckless and not because he
was negligent. The court pointed out that the sports participant
assumes "all risks incidental to that particular activity which are
obvious and foreseeable" but does not assume "the risk of injury
28. Id. at 526.
29. Id. In some instances a plaintiff has tried to base the theory of recovery on the
breach of a safety rule. This approach has generally been rejected by the courts in favor of
analysis based on traditional theories of negligence and recklessness. See Oswald, 406 N.E.2d
157; Marchetti v. Kalish, 559 N.E.2d 699 (Ohio 1990); Gauvin v. Clark, 537 N.E.2d 94 (Mass.
1989). But see Overall v. Kadella, 361 N.W.2d 352 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984)(holding that defen-
dant's actions violated a safety rule and thus gave rise to tort liability).
30. Hackbart I, 435 F. Supp. at 355.
31. 537 N.E.2d 94 (Mass. 1989).
32. Id. at 97, quoting Kabella v. Bouschelle, 672 P.2d 290, 294 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983).
33. 331 So.2d 40 (La. Ct. App. 1976).
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from fellow players acting in an unexpected or unsportsmanlike
way with a reckless lack of concern for others participating."
34
The thrust of the Bourque opinion was that the sports participant
invariably assumes the risks created by the co-participant's negli-
gence but not necessarily by his recklessness.
The relevant case law now clearly supports the view that an
injured sports participant can recover on a showing of recklessness
or intention.3 ' The suggestion in Hackbart I that the sports parti-
cipant is insulated from tort liability has been almost universally
discredited. Hackbart II reflects the modern view that recklessness
is an appropriate cause of action.
The outcome of the litigation will often depend on the availabili-
ty of the defenses. In the recklessness context, the primary defense
is akin to assumption of risk.36 It is interesting to note, however,
34. Id. at 42.
35. A substantial verdict ($3.1 million) was returned in a case involving an assault and
battery in a professional basketball game. See R. YASSER, TORTS AND SPORTS 21-22, 26 (1985)
for the account of the celebrated case, Rudy Tomjanovich v. California Sports, Inc., No. H-78-
243 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 10, 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-3889 (5th Cir. Dec. 3, 1979).
See also Oswald, 406 N.E.2d at 157(deciding that liability for injuries sustained in
physical education class may not be predicated on ordinary negligence); Ross v. Clouser, 637
S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1982) (regarding a case remanded for retrial under a theory of recklessness);
Kabella v. Bouschelle, 672 P.2d 290 (N.M. 1983)(determining injured youth in informal foot-
ball game could not recover on mere negligence); Novak v. Lamar Ins. Co., 488 So. 2d 739
(La. Ct. App. 1986)(concluding that a softball player who injured a first baseman was not
liable since he did not act with reckless lack of concern); Martin v. Buzan 857 S.W.2d 366
(Mo. Ct. App. 1993)(ruling that a base runner in softball game was not liable for injuries to
catcher resulting from collision between the two, where mere negligence, and not reckless-
ness, was found); Connell v. Payne, 814 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991)(concluding that polo
player striking another player with his mallet was not liable when he did not act "recklessly"
or "intentionally"); Picou v. Hartford Ins. Co., 558 So.2d 787 (La. Ct. App. 1990)(resolving
that a base runner on a church league softball team was not liable for injuries resulting from
collision at second base where wanton or reckless disregard for another participant was lack-
ing); Ordway v. Superior Ct. (Casella), 243 Cal. Rptr. 536 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988)(holding that a
jockey who caused another jockey's horse to fall was not liable for injuries to the other jockey
in the absence of reckless or intentional conduct); Keller By and Through Keller v. Mols, 509
N.E.2d 584 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)(concluding that plaintiff floor hockey player was precluded
from recovery on a negligence claim as a matter of law where he had consented to participa-
tion in a contact sport); Santiago v. Clark, 444 F. Supp. 1077 (N.D.W. Va. 1978)(barring a
specific intent to injure or cause an accident on the part of another jockey, there can be no
recovery for injuries caused as a result of'jockey error" or "careless riding" in a horse race).
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A. The assumption of risk defense is simply
defined by the Restatement as an instance when a plaintiff cannot recover from such harm
caused by the negligence or recklessness of the defendant, because the plaintiff voluntarily
assumed such risk of harm. Id. In its simplest form, assumption of risk means:
that the plaintiff has given his express consent to relieve the defendant of an ob-
ligation to exercise care for his protection, and agrees to take his chances as to
injury from a known or possible risk. The result is that the defendant, who would
otherwise be under a duty to exercise such care is relieved of that responsibility
and is no longer under any duty to protect the plaintiff.
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that other defenses to a recklessness-based cause of action have not
been clearly delineated. The practitioner would be well advised to
plead the well established intentional tort defenses of consent, self-
defense, defense of others, and defense of property, along with the
well established negligence defenses of assumption of risk and con-
tributory negligence, and let the court decide.
IV. NEGLIGENCE
No court in the land would hold that intentional conduct fails to
state a cause of action; none have said that recklessness is not a
basis for recovery; but many have stated that negligence is insuffi-
cient.
Nabozny, Hackbart I, Hackbart II, and Gauvin articulate the
view that the simple negligence claim should fail. Although negli-
gence was pleaded in Nabozny, the opinion stressed that "a player
is liable if his conduct is such that it is either deliberate, wilful or
with a reckless disregard for the safety of the other player.", The
implication of Nabozny is that simple negligence will not suffice.
The plaintiff in Hackbart did not rely on a negligence theory. As
the Hackbart H court pointed out, "this [was] in recognition of the
fact that subjecting another to unreasonable risk of harm, the es-
sence of negligence, is inherent in the game of football."3" Gauvin
rejected the negligence cause of action in accepting recklessness as
the appropriate minimum standard. Some courts have held that
ordinary negligence will not support a cause of action in such con-
tact sports as "pickup" basketball, 9 an informal game of touch
football,40  or even an unorganized neighborhood game.4  One
court ruled that actions in a juvenile game of "bombardment" failed
to support a negligence action.4"
Id., cmt. 1.
Implied assumption of risk exists when a plaintiff, who understands the risk of harm
involved within the defendant's conduct, and who nevertheless voluntarily chooses to "enter,
or remain, or to permit his things to enter or remain within the area of that risk," manifests
his acceptance of such risk and is precluded from recovering for the harm suffered. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A(1).
37. Nabozny, 334 N.E.2d at 261.
38. Hackbart II, 601 F.2d at 520.
39. Dotzler v. Tuttle, 449 N.W.2d 774 (Neb. 1990).
40. Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992)(holding that even ordinary recklessness
would not impose liability).
41. Marchetti, 559 N.E.2d 699 (Ohio 1990).
42. Ramos by Ramos, 45 N.E.2d at 418. The facts of this case highlight that the key for
this court was whether or not the activity could be considered a sporting event. The plaintiff,
Alfonzo Ramos, Jr., an 8 year old boy, was injured while playing a game of "bombardment" in
a city's summer recreational program for elementary age children. The plaintiff alleged that
Stephen Best, 14 years old, threw a ball at the plaintiff and struck his left eye, injuring him.
2611995]
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Yet a growing number of jurisdictions are rejecting this ap-
proach and allowing the negligence action. One reason for this may
be that, as Hackbart II notes, the distinction between recklessness
and negligence is not bright-line.4
Generally the courts have taken one of two positions: 1) that
more than negligence is required to state a cause of action or 2)
that negligence is sufficient for recovery. As the discussion on
recklessness has shown, the language used to differentiate negli-
gence from "more" generally includes phrases such as "recklessness
or wilful" or "recklessness or wanton."''
What is really going on in these cases is that courts are strug-
gling to figure out whether or not they will allow a simple negli-
gence cause of action. By now it should be fairly obvious that this
is one of the battle lines in the "torts in sports" debate. But the
courts are also grappling with the more general problem of what
makes the conduct reckless (or wanton or wilful) in the first place?
If the conduct can be declared intentional or reckless, its a slam
dunk.45 If it is negligence at most, the situation is more compara-
ble to shooting at a moving basket - a tough shot to make.
The basis of negligence as a cause of action is conduct that re-
sults in an unreasonable risk of harm to another. Of course, almost
all human activities involve some risk of harm. The gist of a negli-
gence-based claim is that the conduct involves a risk of harm that
is not outweighed by the benefits to be derived from engaging in
the conduct.46 Increasingly, the courts have shown a willingness
This court specifically found that such activity as a game of "bombardment" is a sporting
event, stating that "we do not believe there is a legal distinction between 'bombardment' and
basketball or soccer." Id. at 420. Sports, at least to this court, has its own legal rules of the
game, even where minors are concerned. And participants cannot recover against other par-
ticipants on a negligence theory. Id.
43. Hackbart II, 601 F.2d 516. As Oliver Wendell Holmes noted:
If the manifest probability of harm is very great... we say that it is done inten-
tionally; if not so great but still considerable, we say that the harm is done negli-
gently; if there is no apparent danger, we call it mischance.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Ifitent, 8 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1894).
Today we may add a third category in saying that if the manifest probability of harm
is not very great but quite considerable, it is recklessness. The distinctions are not clear, and
as has been shown in this article, recklessness has relatively recently emerged as a separate
and distinct cause of action.
44. To further complicate the analysis, as with recklessness, sometimes a violation of the
rules of a game may be the basis of a negligence finding. See La Vine v. Clear Creek Skiing
Corp., 557 F.2d 730 (10th Cir. 1977); Stewart v. D. & R. Welding Supply Co., 366 N.E.2d
1107 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977); Toone v. Adams, 137 S.E.2d 132 (N.C. 1964).
45. Score it.
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291:
§ 291. UNREASONABLENESS: HOW DETERMINED: MAGNITUDE OF RISK
AND UTILITY OF CONDUCT.
[Vol. 5262
Participant Liability
to allow the application of this principle in the participant to partic-
ipant sports injury as they do in virtually any other area of our
lives.
In a 1993 decision, the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that
liability in the sports injury case may be based on negligence, de-
pending on the specific circumstances.47 Robert F. Lestina, the
plaintiff, was injured in a collision with the defendant, Leopold
Jerger. Lestina was playing an offensive position for his recrea-
tional soccer team and Jerger was the goal keeper for the opposing
team. Jerger, the defendant, apparently ran out of the goal area
and collided with the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged that the defen-
dant "slide tackled" him in order to prevent him from scoring. The
plaintiff seriously injured his left knee and leg in the collision.
While the Wisconsin Supreme Court acknowledged that rela-
tively few sports cases have held that a plaintiff may recover on
proof of negligence, it ruled in this case that negligence is an appro-
priate standard to govern cases involving injuries during recrea-
tional team contact sports.48
For a time, New Jersey also adopted the negligence standard for
sports injury cases in Crawn v. Campo.49 In Crawn, the appellate
court held that ordinary negligence, rather than reckless conduct,
was the appropriate standard to be applied in a participant to par-
ticipant sports injury case.
Plaintiff Michael Crawn, playing catcher in a pick-up softball
game, was injured in a collision at home plate with defendant John
Campo, an opposing base runner. The lower court ruled, on the
basis of Gauvin and Marchetti, that intentional conduct or reckless
disregard of the safety of others was required to give rise to a cause
of action in a participant to participant sports related injury. This
of course had been the trend. But in overruling the trial court the
appellate court lined itself up with Lestina. The court persuasively
Where an act is one which a reasonable man would recognize as involving a risk of
harm to another, the risk is unreasonable and the act is negligent if the risk is of
such magnitude as to outweigh what the law regards as the utility of the act or of
the particular manner in which it is done.
Id.
47. Lestina v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 501 N.W.2d 28, 33 (Wis. 1993).
48. Id. In a well reasoned opinion the court stated:
Depending as it does on all the surrounding circumstances, the negligence standard
can subsume all the factors and considerations presented by recreational team
contact sports and is sufficiently flexible to permit the 'vigorous competition' that
the defendant urges. We see no need for the court to adopt a recklessness standard
for recreational team contact sports when the negligence standard, properly under-
stood and applied, is sufficient.
49. 630 A.2d 368 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993).
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reasoned that the only two settings in which New Jersey courts
have recognized a negligence immunity is in special situations that
involve the exercise of parental authority or the "fireman's rule.""
New Jersey has however abandoned the simple negligence stan-
dard. Relying on Nabozny, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held
that the duty of care required in establishing liability in recrea-
tional sports should be based on a standard of reckless or inten-
tional conduct, rather than negligence.51
Connecticut joined the ranks of those jurisdictions allowing a
negligence cause of action in 1989. In Babych v. McRae,52 the plai-
intiff, Wayne Babych, alleged that the defendant, Ken McRae, a
fellow professional hockey player, struck the plaintiff across his
right knee with a hockey stick during a game, causing the plaintiff
to suffer personal injuries and financial losses. In holding that
negligence is a legally sufficient cause of action when one profes-
sional sports participant is injured by another, the court rejected
the New York decision in Turcotte v. Fell,53 which held that negli-
gence is not actionable when one professional sports participant
injures another. Babych ruled that there was no analogous Con-
necticut case law barring a negligence cause of action in sports
participant to participant cases.54
As early as 1976, the Missouri Court of Appeals accepted negli-
gence as a viable cause of action in sports related injuries.55 In
50. Id. at 375. The "fireman's rule" allows a fireman or policeman to recover for injuries
that result from hazards that are inherent or incidental to the performance of their duties
only if intentional or wilful misconduct can be shown.
The appellate court concluded:
We thus find no sound reason to immunize sports participants from liability for
their negligent conduct. To the contrary, New Jersey authorities persuade us that
there is every reason to reject such an immunity. A person participating in sports
activities can properly be required to act as a "reasonable [person] of ordinary pru-
dence under the circumstances."
Id.
51. Crawn v. Campo, 136 N.J. 494, 508 (1994). In coming to this conclusion, the court
held that:
a recklessness standard is the appropriate one to apply in the sports context [beca-
use it] is founded on more than a concern for a court's ability to discern adequately
what consitutes reasonable conduct under the highly varied circumstances of infor-
mal sports activity. The heightened standard will more likely result in affixing
liability for conduct that is clearly unreasonable and unacceptable from the perspec-
tive of those engaged in the sport yet leaving free from the supervision of the law
the risk laden conduct that is inherent in sports and more often than not, assumed
to be "part of the game."
Id.
52. 567 A.2d 1269 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1989).
53. 502 N.E.2d 964 (N.Y. 1986).
54. Babych, 567 A.2d at 1270.
55. Niemczyk v. Burleson, 537 S.W.2d 737 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
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Niemczyk, the plaintiff and the defendant were participating in a
softball game in Bell City, Missouri. The plaintiff was a member of
a team from Bell City, and the defendant was a member of a team
from Fisk, Missouri. The plaintiff, a base runner, was running
from first base to second when the defendant ran across the infield
and collided with the plaintiff in the base path. The court accepted
negligence as a cause of action in this instance. It held that
"whether one player's conduct, causing injury to another, consti-
tutes actual negligence hinges upon the facts of the individual
case.
56
In 1992, The Louisiana Court of Appeals also held that negli-
gence was a viable cause of action in the sports injury case. 7 The
plaintiff, Patrick Hendry, was engaged in a game of racquetball
with Robert Panek and Stephen Schoelmann. Hendry was hit in
the face with Panek's racket, when Panek swung the racket too
wide after backhanding a ball. The court held that voluntary par-
ticipants in sporting activities have a duty to play with sportsman-
like conduct, according to the rules of the game, and to refrain from
acts which are unforeseeable and which evidence wanton or reck-
less disregard for the other participants.5" Thus, the court appa-
rently accepted everything from a negligence standard to a reckless-
ness standard in the sports context.
In Ginsberg v. Hontas,5" the plaintiff was playing second base
in a recreational softball game. Defendant was sliding into second
base, and a collision occurred between the plaintiff and the defen-
dant, fracturing the plaintiffs right leg. The court held that the
plaintiff failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant was negligent in his play during the game. The appel-
late court affirmed the lower court's conclusion that the plaintiff
failed to establish that defendant had acted negligently. The court
went on to state however, that "[t]he duty owed by the defendant in
instant matter is a common duty, the duty to act reasonably under
the circumstances." 0 One may reasonably conclude that since the
court based its decision on the plaintiffs failure to meet his burden
of proof, and not on a finding that the plaintiffs theory was based
on a non-viable cause of action, negligence is in fact a viable cause
of action in Louisiana. Unfortunately, the court obfuscated a clear
understanding of the matter by mixing negligence language with
that of recklessness in stating that "[i]n this softball game defen-
56. Id. at 741.
57. Hendry v. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Ins. Co., 594 So. 2d 584 (La. Ct. App. 1992).
58. Id. at 586.
59. 545 So. 2d 1154 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989).
60. Id. at 1155.
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dant owed the plaintiff the duty to act reasonably, that is to play
fairly according to the rules of the game and to refrain from any
wanton, reckless conduct likely to result in harm or injury to anoth-
er.
61
In a 1986 decision, the Washington Court of Appeals allowed
the negligence claim for sports injuries.6 2 Kladnick involved an
injury caused on a skating rink. While it was not a "heat of compe-
tition" case, the court expressed its ruling in terms that encompass
sports cases as a whole, saying that those who participate in sports
or amusements are taken to assume known risks of being hurt,
although they are not deemed to have consented to unsportsman-
like rule violations which are not part of the game." Thus, the
court here bases its ruling, not on the inappropriateness of a negli-
gence cause of action, but rather on an assumption of risk defense.
There are in fact a number of older opinions from which it can
be inferred that the court would allow a negligence cause of action.
While these are not all "heat of competition" cases, they do involve
the sports context and give some insight into the courts' reasoning
on the application of negligence principles to the actions of sports
participants. In these cases, the courts typically talk about the
assumption of risk defense to the negligence cause of action rather
than declaring that negligence fails to state a cause of action in the
first place.
Florida so held in 1983, when it stated that express assumption
of risk is a viable defense to a negligence action in the context of a
contact sport.' The plaintiff, Kuehner, brought a negligence ac-
tion against the defendant, Green. Kuehner had been injured as
the result of a karate take-down maneuver executed by Green dur-
ing a sparring exercise at Green's home. The court appears to
adopt the view that negligence is a viable cause of action in a con-
tact sport. The court found that the plaintiff had subjectively rec-
ognized the danger of the take-down maneuver called a 'leg
sweep."65
Similarly, Minnesota, Michigan, Wisconsin, Louisiana and Cali-
fornia have turned, in the sports injury case, to analysis of defenses
to negligence, rather than of failure of negligence to state a cause of
61. Id.
62. Ridge v. Kiadnick, 713 P.2d 1131 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986).
63. Id. at 1133.
64. Kuehner v. Green, 436 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1983).
65. Id. at 79, 80. It based part of its decision on social policy by saying that "[ilf contact
sports are to continue to serve a legitimate recreational function in our society, express as-




action in the first place. In Lutterman v. Studer,66 the plaintiff
tried out for the 7th grade baseball team. On the first day of prac-
tice, the students were moved indoors because of rain. During a
simulated batting drill, the bat slipped out of the defendant's hand
and struck the plaintiff on the left side of his head. The court held
that in the sports context, as well as other contexts, even where
there is a finding of negligence, proximate cause usually presents a
jury issue. 7 Thus, the court allowed a deliberation by the jury on
the negligence cause of action.
In Carey v. Toles68, the plaintiff, James Carey, age 15, and the
defendant, Edward Toles, age 13, were engaged in an afternoon
pick-up baseball game. Toles, a right handed batter, hit the ball
into right field and started to run. He threw his bat which hit
Carey, who was on the sidelines between home plate and first base.
Carey's injuries required extensive surgery on his mouth and jaw-
bone and the replacement of nine teeth. The court ruled that whe-
ther a minor baseball player was negligent in throwing a bat after
hitting a ball and whether a minor plaintiff was contributorily
negligent in standing on the sidelines are jury questions. 9 The
appellate court remanded for a new trial based on an improper jury
instruction regarding the assumption of risk as it relates to negli-
gence. Note that the court did not rule that negligence in the
sports context fails to state a cause of action.
In Ceplina v. South Milwaukee Sch. Bd.," a minor plaintiff,
Rosemary Ceplina, was injured when she was struck in the face
with a baseball bat swung by the minor defendant, James Pauwels.
Both were 6th grade students. The court held that as a general
rule, the existence of negligence is a question of fact which is to be
decided by the jury. The court expressed the belief that the jury
should decide what the defendant's duty was and whether or not it
was breached, as opposed to the court deciding this issue as a mat-
ter of law.'
In the two Louisiana cases, the Louisiana Court of Appeals
held that even if there was negligence on the part of the defendant,
the plaintiff had assumed the risk of injury resulting from negli-
gence. Once again, the logical inference is that, since defenses to
66. 217 N.W.2d 756 (Minn. 1974).
67. Id. at 758.
68. 151 N.W.2d 396 (Mich. Ct. App. 1967).
69. Id. at 402.
70. 243 N.W.2d 183 (Wis. 1976).
71. Id. at 185.
72. Benedetto v Travelers Ins. Co., 172 So. 2d 354 (La. Ct. App. 1965); Gaspard v. Grain
Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 131 So. 2d 831 (La. Ct. App. 1961).
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the negligence action are analyzed by the court, negligence must be
recognized as a viable cause of action.
In Tavernier v. Maes7 3, the plaintiff and defendant were part of
a family picnic at a public park. The plaintiff was playing second
base and the defendant was running from first to second. The
defendant slid into second base, colliding with the plaintiff, which
resulted in the fracture of both the outer and inner bones of the
plaintiffs left ankle. The court held that in the sports context, as
well as others, one of the key issues in regard to the assumption of
risk defense is 'what did the plaintiff know and when did he know
it.'74 The court allowed a negligence cause of action but gave a
jury instruction of assumption of risk as well. In Hoyt v.
Rosenbergv5 , the plaintiff, Marilyn Hoyt, 11 years old, and the de-
fendant, Jack Rosenberg, 12 years old, were playing "kick the can,"
a form of the old game of hide and seek, with two other children.
The rules are not crucial to understanding this game, but essential-
ly one had to "kick the can" to be the winner. The defendant
kicked the can with some force, striking the plaintiff in the face,
and causing her to lose the use of one eye. The court held that in
deciding whether there had been a failure of a minor to use ordi-
nary care to avoid injury to other children, the test is not what an
adult would have done or what the results indicate should have
been done, but what an ordinary child in that situation would have
done.7' By its holding the court indicates that it would allow a
negligence cause of action in this informal youth "contest."
As pointed out in the material on "recklessness," courts have at
times gone out of their way to distinguish the cause of action in the
contact as opposed to the non-contact sports injury case, by stating
that "participants in bodily contact games such as basketball as-
sume greater risks than do golfers and others involved in non-phys-
ical contact sports."
77
73. 51 Cal. Rptr. 575 (Ct. App. 1966).
74. Id. at 581,582.
75. 182 P.2d 234 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947).
76. Id. at 236.
77. Oswald, 406 N.E.2d at 160. It is beyond the scope of this article to address the mul-
titude of golf cases in which action was brought for a variety of unique and innovative ways
of inflicting serious injury (and not so serious general bonking) on fellow players, caddies, by-
standers, and other innocent victims with the various paraphernalia of the game. In one case
the court rejected the defendant's arguments that he owed no duty to the plaintiff, that the
plaintiff was contributorily negligent, or that the plaintiff assumed the risk. While there was
certainly legal precedence for the defendant's position on these issues, perhaps the appellate
court's conclusion that a golf player has the duty to exercise ordinary care to prevent injury
to others by a driven golf ball, was itself driven by the justices' conclusion that "the uncontra-
dicted evidence is that the defendant was a wild and erratic player and knew that a golf ball
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struck by him was liable to fly at most any angle." Alexander v. Wrenn, 164 S.E. 715, 717
(Va. 1932).
A survey of golf cases reveals a wide range of approaches to injuries caused by skilled
and unskilled players: Thompson v. McNeill, 559 N.E.2d 705 (Ohio 1990)(being hit by a golf
shot of a golfing companion is a foreseeable, customary part of the sport and does not state a
cause of action for negligence because no duty is owed to protect the victim from that con-
duct); Carrigan v. Roussell, 426 A.2d 517 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981)(holding golfer on
first tee did not have duty to give warning before taking a shot, but had duty to give warning
when shot began to hook toward practice area); Rindley v. Goldberg, 297 So.2d 140 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1974)(finding that golfer struck by a ball hit by fellow member of foursome sus-
tained injury that was result of obvious and ordinary risks of the sport of golfing); Mazzu-
chelli v. Nissenbaum, 244 N.E.2d 729 (Mass. 1969)(stating experienced golfer who was struck
in the eye by a golf ball hit by defendant assumed the risk of his injury); Strand v. Conner,
24 Cal.Rptr. 584 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1962)(holding that player of the game of golf in which
many hazards develop from player errors, which cannot be classified as negligent, assumes
the risk of injury from such hazards); Thomas v. Shaw, 124 S.E.2d 396, (Ga. 1962)(stating
that golf player assumes risks of dangers ordinarily incident to game but not negligent acts
of fellow player); Oakes v. Chapman, 322 P.2d 241 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958)(finding that
there was no duty to warn when the plaintiff was not in what a reasonable person would
consider a position of danger when defendant hit the plaintiff with his golf ball); Boynton v.
Ryan, 257 F.2d 70 (3rd Cir. 1958)(holding that where golf player invited a threesome to play
through, there was no duty to warn before the defendant's ball hit the plaintiff); Rose v. Mor-
ris, 104 S.E.2d 485 (Ga. Ct. App. 1958)(stating golf player must give adequate notice to those
who are in apparent danger of getting hit by a ball, but people who are on a golf course must
assume risk of being injured by a hooked or sliced ball); Turel v. Milberg, 169 N.Y.S.2d 955
(N.Y. App. Term. 1957)(asserting that defendant golfer was not liable for injuries sustained
by plaintiff when he was struck by defendant's golf ball, though defendant failed to shout
"fore" before striking the golf ball, where plaintiff saw defendant about to swing at the golf
ball); Trauman v. City of New York, 143 N.Y.S.2d 467 (N.Y. Trial Term 1955)(holding that
golfer intending to strike a ball is not under duty to give traditional warning by yelling "fore"
to persons in such position that danger to them is not reasonably anticipated); Hampson v.
Simon, 104 N.E.2d 112 (Ill. App. Ct. 1952)(finding that no presumption of negligence arises
from the mere fact that a player on a golf course is hit by a ball driven by another player);
Rogers v. Alice Chalmers Mfg. Co., 92 N.E.2d 677 (Ohio 1950)(determining that by participat-
ing in an athletic contest, including golf, a player assumes the ordinary risks of playing the
game, and one of the ordinary risks in playing golf is being hit by a golf ball); Houston v.
Escott, 85 F.Supp. 59 (D. Del. 1949)(stating that golf player assumes risk of injury resulting
from his own participation in playing golf and cannot recover for injuries against another
player when struck by a ball hit by that player when the plaintiff is standing in the line of
play); Walsh v. Machlin, 23 A.2d 157 (Conn. 1941)(asserting that golfer owed duty to com-
panion with whom he was playing to use reasonable care to avoid injuring him); Stober v.
Embry, 47 S.W.2d (K.Y. Ct. App. 1932)(holding that golfer must give notice to those danger-
ously situated who are not aware of his intention to hit the ball); Benjamin v. Nurenberg,
157 A.10 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1931)(stating that golfer owes no duty to warn a player in another
foursome before he attempts a shot, when the other player is not in the line of the golfer's
play); Gortener v. Bordes, 131 So. 494 (La. Ct. App. 1930)(finding that loss of plaintiffs son's
eye when struck with defendant's improvised golf club was not the result of the defendant's
negligence under evidence presented); Wood v. Postelthwaite, 496 P.2d 988 (Wash. Ct. App.
1972)(stating that no duty on golfer to warn exists if other player is not in or near the in-
tended line of flight or the other player is aware of the imminence of the shot); Carroll v.
Askew, 106 S.E.2d 635 (Ga. Ct. App. 1969)(asserting that golf player does not assume risk of
negligent acts of a fellow player); Neumann v. Shlansky, 294 N.Y.S.2d 628 (Co. Ct.
1968)(holding that a golfer owes a duty to use reasonable care to avoid injuring other players
on the golf course); Getz v. Freed, 105 A.2d 102 (Pa. 1954)(determining that golfer is negli-
gent where he drives a ball, without warning, and the plaintiff is not walking or standing
within the orbit of the shot of the defendant). If you are still reading this footnote you are; a)
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When negligent conduct proximately causes harm, a prima facie
case is established. The main defenses to a negligence-based claim
are contributory negligence and assumption of risk. Each of these
defenses once operated as a complete bar to the negligence claim.
Comparative negligence legislation now applicable in most states
has changed this common law rule." Under comparative negli-
gence statutes, a contributorily negligent plaintiff is not necessarily
precluded from recovery. A negligence-based claim in sports may
be won or lost over the availability of an assumption of risk de-
fense. As with consent in the intentional tort action, the assump-
tion of risk defense will require the court to determine the nature of
the risks that the willing participant assumes.
The best advice to a practitioner representing an injured sports
participant is to plead the three causes of action in the alternative.
This would be done in the same manner as one would plead breach
of warranty, negligence, and strict liability on behalf of a consumer
injured by a defective product.
V. CONCLUSION
A growing number of states appear to recognize negligence as a
viable cause of action in the "heat of competition" context. In al-
most every area of our lives we are exposed to liability if we act in
a negligent manner and cause harm to others. For the most part,
our social compact says that unreasonable conduct which causes
physical harm is actionable. This rule of liability is firmly ground-
ed in social policy. The exposure to liability serves to deter unrea-
sonably risky behavior and to compensate the injured.
In a few limited areas, actors are insulated from liability for
ordinary negligence. These exemptions, too, are rooted in policy.
For example, in the area of defamation law, a plaintiff who is a
public person can ordinarily recover for injury to reputation only
upon a clear and convincing showing of "knowledge of falsity or
reckless disregard for truth or falsity."79 This solicitude for speech
is grounded in strong social policy; we are as a people deeply com-
mitted to free speech and a wide-open, robust discussion of issues of
an avid golfer, b) an avid student of sports law, c) generally abnormal, d) any combination of
the above. Query whether any of these cases belong in the context of a discussion involving
participant versus participant liability in sports. Golf, after all, is more of a game (like chess)
than a sport (like football).
78. See e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-1765; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156; MISS. CODE
ANN. § 11-7-15; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 13; TEX REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212A; WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 4.22005.
79. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1964).
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public concern. In order to give speech the breathing room it needs
to thrive, negligent speakers are insulated from liability.
Another area where liability is circumscribed concerns conduct
which causes severe emotional distress, but no immediate physical
harm. Here, too, for reasons of policy, the actor is insulated from
liability for ordinary negligence. To succeed, the plaintiff must
show intentional or reckless conduct of an "extreme and outrageous
nature."0 The negligent infliction of even severe emotional dis-
tress is generally not actionable because of strong and clearly artic-
ulated policy concerns. This immunity from liability for negligence
is premised upon both the absence of physical harm and the desire
to nurture an environment where people feel free. The theory is
that holding an actor responsible for emotional distress caused by
negligence would undermine deeply held liberty interests. People
would be afraid to say and to do for fear of causing compensable
emotional upset.8 ' There are other areas, too, where the negligent
actor is exempt from liability.82 But for the most part, the pre-
vailing view is that unreasonable actors are responsible for harm
caused. This is in recognition of the fact that negligence is a sound
basis for liability. Exemptions are relatively rare, and grounded
firmly in social policy.
Does it make sense, then, to insulate a negligent sports partici-
pant from liability to a physically injured co-participant? Is sports
deserving of such solicitude? Are there really convincing policy
reasons to insulate a sports participant from liability for physical
harm caused by negligence?
The courts that require an injured sports participant to prove
recklessness (and thus protect the "merely" negligent actor) do so
on the theory that sports, like speech, needs "breathing room." But
the evidence is accumulating that, on every level of competition,
participants need to be restrained and not emboldened. From kids'
sports to professional sports, sportsmanship, fair play and reason-
able restraint are lost values. Grotesque showmanship, unethical
means to win, and reckless unconcern mar the landscape of sport.
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46.
81. As Magruder put it:
[a]gainst a large part of the frictions and irritations and clashing of temperaments
incident to participation in a community life, a certain toughening of the hide is a
better protection than the law could ever be.
Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033,
1035 (1936).
82. For example, under the traditional common law rule a landowner owes no duty to a
trespasser; or more accurately stated, he owes a duty to refrain from intentional harm, but
not much more.
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Sports participants don't need breathing room; they should rather
have their feet held to the liability fire.
I must confess that what I have just said pains me. I am a
sports enthusiast with few peers; I play sports, watch sports, coach
sports and even study sports. But the simple truth is that sports
must be placed back in perspective. (It is not as important as polit-
ical speech). Insulating sports participants from liability for ordi-
nary negligence sends all the wrong messages. Even in the heat of
competition, participants can and should be expected to behave rea-
sonably.
